Fifty years after their first contact, Japan established diplomatic relations with Turkey in 1924. Shohei Akagawa explains how peacemaking in the Near East helped Japan claim a seat at the top table.

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Shohei is a Research Fellow at The Japan Institute of International Affairs.

As one of the Allied Powers, Japan was a signatory to both the Treaty of Sèvres and the Treaty of Lausanne. Formal diplomatic relations between Japan and Turkey, however, were only established after Lausanne came into effect in August 1924. Considering that the first contact between Japan and the Ottoman Empire had taken place in 1873, this was rather late. Why did it take Japan half a century to take this step? And why did Japan decide to take it in 1923?

Ever since the beginning of the Meiji period (1868) Japan had taken a particular interest in Russia, an empire straddling the Near and Far East, and sought to establish friendly relations with the Ottoman Empire as a counterweight. In the late nineteenth century Japan’s leaders repeatedly sought to enter the Ottoman capitulatory system. Most Favoured Nation status as well as the consular protections associated with that system held symbolic value for Japan, as a means of establishing itself as a “civilised” power within the global imperial order. The 1894 Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation ended British consular jurisdiction within Japan’s borders, while the 1896 Sino-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation granted Japan consular jurisdiction over the Chinese mainland. These fillips to Japanese prestige as an emerging power made the lack of parity accorded Japan in the Ottoman Empire appear increasingly anomalous.

Japanese forces did not engage with those of the Ottoman Empire during the Great War. Other than seizing German assets in the Far East and forestalling meddling by other nations, Japan sought to stand aside from the conflict. Peace negotiations with Turkey nonetheless afforded an excellent opportunity to showcase Japan’s status as an Allied Power and overcome impediments to establishing diplomatic relations. In the wake of the War Japan felt it had graduated from rule-taker to the rule-maker, acting alongside other Great Powers in the international community. From the Paris Peace Conference to Sèvres, however, Japan’s involvement in discussions over Turkey was not always welcome. At Paris discussions took place in the Council of Four (Clemenceau, Lloyd George, Orlando and Wilson), excluding Japan. At the London Conference in 1920, the chairman (Lloyd George), even changed the agenda so that the Turkish question could be disussed in the absence of the Japanese delegate, Chinda Sutemi. Japan nonetheless maintained a policy of cooperation with the Great Powers, and became a stakeholder in the Near East by becoming a signatory to the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres.

BARON HAYASHI, DETAIL FROM ALOÏS DERSO & EMERY KELÈN, GUIGNOL À LAUSANNE (1923), PLATE 17.

In 1921 the Japanese steamship Heimei-Maru was captured by Greece en route to Istanbul. It was carrying around 1,000 Turkish prisoners of war and civilian internees that had been handed over by Russia to Japanese protection. Working in collaboration with the League of Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross, Japan negotiated for the prisoners’ release. The Heimei-Maru incident bolstered Japan’s claims to a role in wider discussions over the fate of the Ottoman Empire.

The victory of the Ankara Government came as a shock, and led to a shift in perspective and policy. Japan sent its ambassador to Britain, Gonsuke Hayashi, to represent it at Lausanne. Hayashi believed that Japan could and should help Turkey and other Asian countries develop, even if this meant Japan having to abandon hopes of parity with other Allied Powers. Hayashi’s instructions from his Foreign Minister Uchida Kōsai were to support Turkish sovereignty while ensuring that Japan enjoyed the same rights with respect to the “New Turkey” as the other Allied Powers. Hayashi sought to strike a balance:

On the one hand, we showed our support for the position of the great powers, but on the other, we had to secretly suggest to Turkey that ‘in the end, you should kick off the rejection of the powers’. Turkey seemed greatly strengthened by this, and her persistence was rewarded. Turkey was delighted, but I also breathed a sigh of relief.

Gonsuke Hayashi, Waga Nanajūnen wo Kataru [Retrospective of My 70 years] (Tokyo: Daiichi Shobō, 1935), p. 363.

The Treaty of Lausanne represented a diplomatic victory for Turkey, placing it on an almost equal footing with the Great Powers. Japan viewed this as a victory for Japan as well. Diplomatic relations between Japan and Turkey were formally established when the Treaty came into force on 6 August 1924. The first Japanese embassy in the Near East was opened in Istanbul on 23 March 1925.

IMAGES: AGENCE ROL, BARON ISCHI [HAYASHI], LAUSANNE, 20 NOVEMBER 1922.

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