
Maxime Gauin on the forgotten Greek devastation of western Anatolia and the Turkish case for reparations at Lausanne.
Maxime is a member of the Institute for Development and Diplomacy at ADA University in Baku.
One of the less-discussed aspects of the Lausanne conference, especially in Western countries, is the Turkish delegation’s demand for reparations for the Hellenic Army’s devastation of Turkish territory. Yet this issue was raised at the beginning of the negotiations, notably at the first meeting of the commission on economic and financial questions, was hotly debated right down to May 1923, and has cast its shadow over Turkey’s economic history, over Greek-Turkish relations, and over memory of the Turkish war of liberation.
The war crimes started the very first day of the invasion in May 1919. The report of the French-British-Italian-American commission established to investigate the conditions of the landing and its aftermath concluded that between 300 and 400 Turks were killed or wounded between 15 and 17 May, and that “during the days of May 15 and 16 numerous acts of violence and looting were carried out in the town against Turkish persons and dwellings. Fezzes were torn off and Turks no longer dared go out with this headgear. Many women were raped.”[1] Contrary to what is sometimes claimed, U.S. Admiral Mark Bristol did not write the report (it was written by French General Georges Bunoust). Nor was Bristol “President” of the commission (this position did not exist).[2]
French Naval Intellifence estimated that 250 to 300 Turks were killed, and 500 to 600 wounded, before observing that, when it came to “the thefts and looting, it would take a volume to mention a quarter of what was committed.” [3] The killings and devastation continued into 1920, including acts perpetrated by Armenian gangs acting under Greek command, but the scope of the devastations changed in 1921, for two main reasons. First, the new royalist cabinet dreamed of realizing ambitions presented in 1919 by Eleftherios Venizelos, namely to annex the whole Aegean and Marmara littoral. This explains that “extermination of the Muslim population” which the International Red Cross observed on the Yalova peninsula in 1921, territory far from the front.
The second factor is the emergence of a scorched earth policy, visible as early as March 1921, at the time of the Greek defeats (first battle of Inönü in January, second battle of Inönü in March-April): Bilecik was burned by Armenian gangs that month, and in June İzmit was burned by Greek forces, Armenian gangs killing thousands of Turkish civilians. [4] Not surprisingly, this practice intensified in summer 1921, in the context of the new offensive (and defeat) of the Hellenic Army (battle of Sakarya). Near East Relief (NER) workers Florence Billinge and Annie Allen visited eight villages ravaged by the Greek forces and estimated that a total of 130 villages had been destroyed, in the space of a few months.[5] They identified no military justification for these acts. Yet this part of the NER history is little known in Turkey and ignored elsewhere, even in the U.S. (unlike, it is true, the investigations on Yalova).
Everything was ransacked, whoever owned it, Greek, Turkish, or other, then set on fire. In the Turkish dwellings, the inhabitants were, as far as the fugitives could, burned alive, without mercy, men, women and children. They also set fire to the important and famous carpet factories of Ouchak.
Camille Toureille
Peak devastation was reached during the Hellenic Army’s retreat in 1922. In a very detailed report, French engineer Camille Toureille wrote: “Everything was ransacked, whoever owned it, Greek, Turkish, or others, then set on fire. In the Turkish dwellings, the inhabitants were…burned alive, without mercy, men, women and children. They also set fire to the important and famous carpet factories of Ouchak.”[6] The second investigation of the International Red Cross, this time carried out by Rodolphe Haccius and Henri Cuénod, confirmed this appraisal.[7] The practice of burning Turks alive is mentioned by investigations such as that of Berthe Georges-Gaulis (journalist) and Lieutenant Perry (American intelligence officer).[8]
Nor was this violence and destruction carried out by ethnic Greeks alone. Armenian volunteers played a leading role in the incineration of Manisa, as noted in a report of 8 September 1922 by Ahmet Zeki, commander of the 2nd Turkish division.[9] French priest and member of Parliament Émile Wetterlé considered the one billion liras demands by the Turkish delegation at Lausanne “modest” in the context of the widespread destruction he had witnessed.[10]
At Lausanne Venizelos initially tried to deny the 1919-1920 episodes and to justify those of 1921-1922 on grounds of military necessity, only to subsequently admit the obvious. The Greek delegation argued, however, that the Hellenic state was not in an economic position to provide more than a symbolic reparation. They were persuaded that the Turks would not recommence hostilities over the size of any reparations. In lieu of any monetary compensation a compromise was reached in May 1923, which saw the annexation of Karaağaç (near Edirne, in Eastern Thrace) by Turkey and the insertion of a reference (article 59 of the Lausanne treaty) to the illegality of the “damages” caused by the Greek forces, as violations of 1899 Hague Convention.
Coming on the heels of the Balkan Wars and the resulting flows of refugees, the devastation of Western Anatolia (and, to a lesser extent, eastern Thrace) by the Hellenic Army constituted a burden for the Turkish economy and public finances. Yet the policy of reconciliation adopted by 1928 would prove incompatible with state-sponsored memory of Greek destruction. While the Cyprus conflict changed everything during the 1960s, at least for a Turkish audience, otherwise the devastation of 1919-22 is scarcely mentioned in Western historiography.[11]
Notes
[1] Documents on British Foreign Policy (London: HMSO, 1948), First Series, 2: 241.
[2] Marjorie Housepian, Smyrna 1922. The Destruction of a City (New York, Newmark Press, 1998), pp. 70-71; Yves Ternon, L’Empire ottoman. La chute, le déclin, l’effacement (Paris: Félin, 2002), p. 425.
[3] S. R. Marine, Turquie, 20 May and 2 June 1919, pp. 9-11. Service historique de la défense (SHD), Vincennes, 1 BB7 232, nos. 717 and 772.
[4] Rapport du capitaine Renaudineau, inspecteur du régiment de Constantinople, 29 mars 1921. SHD, 20 N 1102 ; Telegram of Admiral Bristol, 29 June 1921, in Çağrı Erhan (éd.), American Documents on Greek Occupation of Anatolia (Ankara: SAM, 1999), p. 92.
[5] “Report of Miss Florence Billinge, Member of the American Relief, Anatolia”, Inquiries in Anatolia (Lausanne: Permanent Bureau of the Turkish Assembly, 1922), ch. 3.
[6] Camille Toureille, “La Proche Orient et le pétrole”, Bulletin de la Société française des ingénieurs coloniaux, 1 Jan. 1923, 117-30.
[7] Rodolphe Haccius and Henri Cuénod, “Mission en Anatolie”, International Review of the Red Cross 4.47 (1922): 961-71.
[8] Berthe Georges-Gaulis, “En Anatolie: La bataille et la retraite d’août et septembre 1922”, Orient et Occident 2.13 (15 Jan. 1923): 23-46.
[9] “İzmir’e ilk giren subayların isimlerini içeren 8 Eylül 1922 tarihli yazı”, Askeri Tarih Belgeleri Dergisi 56.121 (Dec. 2007): 124-7.
[10] Émile Wetterlé, En Syrie avec le général Gouraud (Paris: Flammarion, 1924), p. 83.
[11] See Harp Tarihi Vesikaları Dergisi 38 (December 1961), 44 (June 1963), 51 (March 1965), 62 (Dec. 1967) and 64 (June 1968), as well as the first translation into modern Turkish (by Hüseyin Fevzi Ayberk, in 1970) of Yunan Mezalimi, a book initially published at the end of 1922 by Falih Rıfkı Atay, Halide Edip, Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu and Mehmet Asım Us.
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